Among the many components of legal preparedness for public health emergencies is the assurance that the public health workforce and its private sector partners are competent to use the law to facilitate the performance of essential public health services and functions. This is a significant challenge. Multiple categories of emergencies, stemming from natural disasters to emerging infectious diseases, confront public health practitioners. Interpreting, assessing, and applying legal principles during emergencies are complicated by the changing legal environment and differences in governmental (...) organization of emergency management functions. While law and legal competencies are essential to routine public health practices, once government declares a state of public health emergency or disaster, the legal landscape changes. Typical legal responses to protect the public's health may no longer be the norm. Public health practitioners, legal counsel, health care partners, and others need to be able to assess changing laws and policies and apply them in real-time. (shrink)

Estimates of unknown quantities are influenced by both self-generated anchors (SGAs) and externally provided anchors (EPAs; e.g., the advice of others). It was hypothesised that people use the degree of similarity between these anchors to render final responses. Thus we tested predictions drawn from metacognitive accounts of anchoring using procedures similar to the traditional anchoring paradigm. In a single experiment we manipulated SGA–EPA similarity, EPA level, and EPA source credibility. Results showed that the relationship between SGA–EPA similarity and the decision (...) weight given to the EPA, relative to the weight given to the SGA, depended on source credibility. Bolstering the metacognitive framework, participants were most confident about their final responses when their SGA was similar to the EPA and the EPA came from a highly credible source. These results support a metacognitive account of the anchoring heuristic. (shrink)

We sometimes say about certain things (such as philosophical questions) that they are ‘deep’ or ‘profound’. But what does it mean exactly? Surprisingly, philosophers have been quite silent on this topic and there is neither consensual nor prominent conceptual analysis of ‘depth’. After surveying different proposals that have tried to capture depth in terms of explanatory depth, subject matter, emotional impact, understanding or complexity, we present the results of three studies in which we combine qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate (...) the everyday concept of ‘depth’. Our results suggest that depth and profundity are generally characterized as (i) something with a meaning, (ii) that stimulates cognitive activity, to (iii) promote epistemic progress about (iv) important issues, thus (v) having an emotional impact. Based on these findings, we propose a first characterization of the ordinary concepts of depth and profundity. (shrink)

The paper discusses the Anglo-American philosophy of law of the 20th century, more specifically the philosophy of law of Ronald Myles Dworkin and his criticism of the legal positivism of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. The author presents the history of the criticism of legal positivism in Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law and distinguishes historical stages. The subject of the study is the critique of legal positivism but not the Hart-Dworkin debate itself, well known in Western philosophy of law. The (...) reason is that the discussion was conducted between Dworkin and Hart’s supporters but not between Dworkin and Hart by himself. The latter responded to the criticism only after twenty seven years. The article explains why Dworkin chose for his criticism Herbert Hart’s version of legal positivism. This is due to the fact that Dworkin highly appreciated Hart’s positivist theory of law and characterized it as the “most clear.” The article presents the methodological foundations of criticism of Hart’s legal positivism in Dworkin’s philosophy of law. It reveals a methodological divergence between the two legal theories, which directly affects the understanding of the concept of law and its content. Therefore, we can assume that the legal theories of Hart and Dworkin are two competing models of law: Dworkin’s model considers law as a set of rules and principles and Hart’s model acknowledges only rules and court decisions as a source of law. The article also presents the key principles of positivism criticized by Dworkin. These principles, firstly, interpret law as a set of legal rules determined through a special legal criterion, secondly, provide the judge with an opportunity to make a decision “at his own discretion” in a situation not regulated by law, and, thirdly, recognize only legal rights and obligations enshrined in legal regulations. It is important to note that in this article the author describes criticism as an independent phenomenon of legal philosophy with a particular focus on the history and foundations of this phenomenon. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christianity, Democracy, and the Shadow of Constantine eds. by George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle PapanikolaouMyles Werntz and Logsdon SeminaryChristianity, Democracy, and the Shadow of Constantine Edited by George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou new york: fordham university press, 2017. 304 pp. $125.00 / $35.00Since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, one of the new rapprochements that has emerged is between the worlds of Eastern Orthodoxy and that (...) of Protestants and Catholics. In this set of constructive essays, contributors from each of these veins of Christianity explore the relationship between Christianity and democracy from their vantage point. Drawing together political theologians, ethicists, and historical theologians, the volume creates an encounter between "East" and "West" that addresses some critical questions facing the whole of Christianity.The first section of essays details the post-Communist situation for Orthodox churches and how they wrestle with traditions of human rights. These essays set the scene broadly for the second set of essays, which bring together Protestant and Catholic political thought together with their Orthodox counterparts. In this section, essays from Luke Bretherton on consociational democracy, Eric Gregory on Augustine and the Good Samaritan, and Nathaniel Wood on Russian visions of theosis in a liberal world make for compelling and informative contributions. The third section—a historical set of essays—explores the actual influence of Constantine's theopolitical vision in the East and West. Contributions from luminaries such as Timothy D. Barnes and J. Bryan Hehir elucidate some of the effects of a theopolitical synthesis in various historical epochs. Barnes's essay on what did and did not occur in Constantinople is of particular note here. The final section, a single essay by Stanley Hauerwas, "How (Not) to Be a Political Theologian," is a vintage essay reflecting on legacies of "Constantinian" thinking in American Christianity.The most prominent strengths of the volume are twofold. First, it brings into focus one of the critical challenges facing Christianity globally: political representation. Presently, the globe is engulfed in any number of challenges to popular sovereignty, whether conceived of in terms of revolution or tyranny. As such, democracy—while imperfect and theologically problematic in many respects—is the de facto form of governance standing between these extremes. Christian traditions of all persuasions have reasons to be suspicious of even the best of these alternatives, making this set of essays all the more pressing. Second, it contributes in a practical way to the ecumenical labors taking place in synods and councils across the world. While the World Council of Churches has undertaken some of the common moral issues affecting various Protestant [End Page 202] communions, cooperation among Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic communions remains ad hoc. Volumes such as this contribute to the practical work of more highly publicized doctrinal discussions.As with most edited volumes, the vast theme of the book tends to be cumbersome; linking together Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox sources around democracy and liberalism creates a wide-ranging but at times unfocused conversation. The quality of the essays themselves is quite uniformly good—a rarity among edited volumes!—but such a wide range of topics and contributors makes for a set of essays that is more indicative of future discussions than definitive. In short, the volume illuminates and provocatively indicates future directions without being a definitive statement on democracy and Christianity, opening new doors for future work.Myles WerntzHardin-Simmons UniversityLogsdon SeminaryHardin-Simmons UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

I EXISTENTIAL PROOFS INTRODUCTION Metaphysical problems, like all philosophical problems, arise from a sense of puzzlement. What is puzzling is that the ...

Volume 34, Issue 8, December 2020, Page 1746-1752.

This is a close scrutiny of "De Anima II 5", led by two questions. First, what can be learned from so long and intricate a discussion about the neglected problem of how to read an Aristotelian chapter? Second, what can the chapter, properly read, teach us about some widely debated issues in Aristotle's theory of perception? I argue that it refutes two claims defended by Martha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Sorabji: (i) that when Aristotle speaks of the perceiver becoming (...) like the object perceived, the assimilation he has in mind is ordinary alteration of the type exemplified when fire heats the surrounding air, (ii) that this alteration stands to perceptual awareness as matter to form. Claim (i) is wrong because the assimilation that perceiving is is not ordinary alteration. Claim (ii) is wrong because the special type of alteration that perceiving is is not its underlying material realisation. Indeed, there is no mention in the text of any underlying material realisation for perceiving. The positive aim of II 5 is to introduce the distinction between first and second potentiality, each with their own type of actuality. In both cases the actuality is an alteration different from ordinary alteration. Perception exemplifies one of these new types of alteration, another is found in the acquisition of knowledge and in an embryo's first acquisition of the power of perception. The introduction of suitably refined meanings of 'alteration' allows Aristotle to explain perception and learning within the framework of his physics, which by definition is the study of things that change. He adapts his standard notion of alteration, familiar from "Physics" III 1-3 and "De Generatione et Corruptione" I, to the task of accounting for the cognitive accuracy of (proper object) perception and second potentiality knowledge: both are achievements of a natural, inborn receptivity to objective truth. Throughout the paper I pay special attention to issues of text and translation, and to Aristotle's cross-referencing, and I emphasise what the chapter does not say as well as what it does. In particular, the last section argues that the textual absence of any underlying material realisation for perceiving supports a view I have defended elsewhere, that Aristotelian perception involves no material processes, only standing material conditions. This absence is as telling as others noted earlier. Our reading must respect the spirit of the text as Aristotle wrote it. (shrink)

The empires of the ancient Near East and Mediterranean invented cosmopolitan politics. In the first millennia BCE and CE, a succession of territorially extensive states incorporated populations of unprecedented cultural diversity. Cosmopolitanism and Empire traces the development of cultural techniques through which empires managed difference in order to establish effective, enduring regimes of domination. It focuses on the relations of imperial elites with culturally distinct local elites, offering a comparative perspective on the varying depth and modalities of elite integration in (...) five empires of the ancient Near East and Mediterranean. If cosmopolitanism has normally been studied apart from the imperial context, the essays gathered here show that theories and practices that enabled ruling elites to transcend cultural particularities were indispensable for the establishment and maintenance of trans-regional and trans-cultural political orders. As the first cosmopolitans, imperial elites regarded ruling over culturally disparate populations as their vocation, and their capacity to establish normative frameworks across cultural boundaries played a vital role in the consolidation of their power. Together with an introductory chapter which offers a theory and history of the relationship between empire and cosmopolitanism, the volume includes case studies of Assyrian, Seleukid, Ptolemaic, Roman, and Iranian empires that analyze encounters between ruling classes and their subordinates in the domains of language and literature, religion, and the social imaginary. The contributions combine to illustrate the dilemmas of difference that imperial elites confronted as well as their strategies for resolving the cultural contradictions that their regimes precipitated. (shrink)

Much discussion surrounding Christian nonviolence in the late twentieth century has centered around the ecclesiocentric version popularized by Stanley Hauerwas. In this essay, I assess the manner in which virtue is connected to internal church practices for Hauerwas, such that displaying nonviolence external to the church risks losing the formative nature of church life. Using examples from contemporary proponents, I argue that when internal church practices, such as prayer, economic sharing, and interpersonal reconciliation are performed publically, they form their practitioners (...) in the virtues which Hauerwas values, but in a way which transposes nonviolence into a public key. (shrink)

Sorabji has written a comprehensive and scholarly volume on the concepts of Time, Creation, and the Continuum and their development from antiquity up until the early middle ages. The major portion of the book, however, focuses on the ancient period from the pre-Socratics through the Neoplatonic period. Sorabji does, however, trace the influence of Hellenistic thought on early medieval theory especially that of the Islamic tradition. Before going into some of the specific areas that are covered it is worth noting (...) that this work is a contribution not only to philosophy but to mathematics, physics, and other disciplines interested in the topic of time. A word of caution. This is a formidable book to digest, not because of any deficiency on the part of the author but because of the subject matter which demands at least an elementary grasp of physics. For those who are willing to apply themselves diligently to the task of accompanying Sorabji in his scrupulous analysis of the texts and trenchant criticism the venture will be rewarded. The scope of Sorabji's project is so extensive that one would anticipate that the material might be treated superficially. This is not the case. He is so conscientious in mining the original texts as well as secondary sources that we cannot but be impressed by his commitment to scholarship and thoroughness. An example of the author's credentials as a scholar is the fact that he includes in the book no less than 476 bibliographical entries categorized under very specific headings. An instance of this is that under the general rubric of Time there are listings under the categories of Time and determinism, Is time real?, Time, change and flow, and Timelessness and changelessness. The chapters are replete with footnotes and cross referencing. To further facilitate the reader there is an extensive index that exhausts every conceivable person and subject discussed in the corpus. This is a decided advantage since the book is of such quality that it deserves to serve as a permanent source book especially for those interested in the concept of time as it develops in the ancient period. What does Sorabji offer in the way of content? In Part I on "The Reality of Time" the question is raised, "Is Time Real?" Subsequently, Chapter 2 offers the solutions from Diodorus to August. Chapter 3 is titled "Iamblichus' Solution: Static and Flowing Time," Chapter 4, "Aristotle on Static and Flowing Time," and Chapter 5, "Solutions by the Last Athenian Neoplatonists." Part II is concerned with "Eternity," Part III, "Time and Creation," Part IV, "Creation and Cause," Part V, "Atoms, Time-Atoms and the Continuum," a total of 26 chapters. While the main intent of Sorabji is to critically examine the texts and give his own exegesis supported by other commentators of note he is not remiss in giving recognition to those of opposing views, such as Norman Kretzmann, A. C. Lloyd, and Myles Burnyeat. If one could trigger in on one or more positive contributions of the book it is the consideration rendered to some less well known or at least less treated philosophers of the ancient period such as Diodorus Cronus, Iamblichus and Damascius, to cite only a few. One of the most stimulating chapters is the one on eternity in which Sorabji raises the question, "Is eternity timeless?" The answer would seem to have recourse to analytic analysis of the concept of eternity that implies opposition to time. But the fact is there are a plethora of interpretations of the concept that do not espouse the timelessness of eternity and Sorabji investigates them all with a commitment to give air to both negative and positive responses to the question although he asserts at the beginning what his own response is. Whatever effort is spent in mining the contents of this book will be remunerated by an in-depth, scholarly, and provocative analysis of some of the theories of time that have come down to us from the Hellenistic period and have since been revived and subjected to scrutiny even in the last decade with the emergence of the quantum theory that proposes an atomic structure of the universe.--Kathleen R. Madden, De Paul University, Chicago. (shrink)

Climate justice activists envision a “postcarbon” future that not only transforms energy infrastructures but also redresses the fossil fuel economy’s long-standing racial inequalities. Yet this anti-racist rebranding of the “zero emissions” telos does not tend to the racial grief that’s foundational to white supremacy. Accordingly, I ask: can we address racial oppression through a “just transition” to a “postcarbon” moment? In response, I connect today’s postcarbon imaginary with yesterday’s postcolonial imaginary. Drawing from research on US-based climate activism, I explore how (...) the utopic rhetoric of a “just transition” is instantiated in practice. I argue that the racialized absences constitutive of what scholars call “postcolonial amnesia” are operative in the anti-racist move to a postcarbon moment. This postcarbon imaginary formulates the vulnerability of people of color to biophysical disasters as the raison d’être for infrastructural transformation. This, I argue, has the effect of overlooking the ways in which racial grief inheres in such vulnerability and the capacity of energy infrastructures to uphold racist hierarchies. I situate this “postcarbon amnesia” in Anne Cheng’s framework for differentiating “grief” from “grievance,” calling for renewable energy transitions that move away from enumerative grievances and toward a sobering recognition of racial grief. (shrink)

This article examines why U.S. healthcare professionals became involved in “enhanced interrogation,” or torture, during the War on Terror. A number of factors are identified including a desire on the part of these professionals to defend their country and fellow citizens from future attack; having their activities approved and authorized by legitimate command structures; financial incentives; and wanting to prevent serious harm from occurring to prisoners/detainees. The factors outlined here suggest that psychosocial factors can influence health professionals’ ethical decision-making.

In 'on the analysis of causation' ("synthese", Volume 21, 1970), We argued that any analysis of causation entailing that "a" caused "b" only if "a" is the set of conditions necessary and sufficient for "b" yields a formal contradiction. In 'causal necessity and logical necessity' ("philosophical studies", Volume 28, 1975), David sanford objects to that argument, Concentrating his attack on the notions of causal necessity and total sets of antecedent conditions. We reply in this paper that, Although sanford's objections help (...) clarify the issues, They are not telling. (shrink)

This article examines Bourdieu’s adoption of Husserl’s concept of ‘doxa’ and argues that Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl overpolarizes doxa (or sens pratique) and reflexivity. The article argues that there is a need for Bourdieusian sociology to adopt a more complex interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology in order to understand the potential range of states of consciousness between doxa and reflexivity. In contrast to Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl, this article argues that the philosophical underlabouring for an adequate understanding of doxa is now (...) available within recent Husserlian studies which marks a radical development from earlier readings in the ‘sociology of consciousness’. (shrink)

Anyone who has read Plato’s Republic knows it has a lot to say about mathematics. But why? I shall not be satisfied with the answer that the future rulers of the ideal city are to be educated in mathematics, so Plato is bound to give some space to the subject. I want to know why the rulers are to be educated in mathematics. More pointedly, why are they required to study so much mathematics, for so long?

This is a collection of the late Heda Segvic's papers in ancient moral philosophy. At the time of her death at age forty-five in 2003, Segvic had already established herself as an important figure in ancient philosophy, making bold new arguments about the nature of Socratic intellectualism and the intellectual influences that shaped Aristotle's ideas. Segvic had been working for some time on a monograph on practical knowledge that would interpret Aristotle's ethical theory as a response to Protagoras. The essays (...) collected here are those on which her reputation rests, including some that were intended to form the backbone of her projected monograph. The papers range from a literary study of Homer's influence on Plato's Protagoras to analytic studies of Aristotle's metaphysics and his ideas about deliberation. Most of the papers reflect directly or indirectly Segvic's idea that both Socrates' and Aristotle's universalism and objectivism in ethics could be traced back to their opposition to Protagorean relativism. The book represents the considerable achievements of one of the most talented scholars of ancient philosophy of her generation. (shrink)

The 2008 Aquinas Lecture, Aristotle's Divine Intellect, was delivered on February 24, 2008, by Myles F. Burnyeat, Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University, and Honorary Fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge University.

These five essays began a debate about the nature and scope of ancient scepticism which has transformed our understanding of what scepticism originally was. Together they provide a vigorous and highly stimulating introduction to the thought of the original sceptics, and shed new light on its relation to sceptical arguments in modern philosophy.

For the past 3 years, since acquiring formal training in healthcare ethics and philosophy, I have been one of those physicians who “does” ethics. I teach medical students and residents, write articles, speak at conferences, chair an ethics committee, and informally consult with colleagues on cases where they request advice related to ethical issues in the care of patients. These activities have been a rewarding and challenging part of my practice. There has also been a fair amount of frustration. Unfortunately, (...) both in teaching and patient care, it has been a frequent experience to finish a discussion with physicians only to be told that what I said was nice but had no bearing in the real world. In the words of a medical resident: 'You know, this ethics stuff is really a lot of crap, isn't it?'. (shrink)